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Abstract
We use a novel firm-level dataset to test whether trust affects the volume and the
ownership structure of FDI across Europe. Our methodology deals with the endogene-
ity of trust from the investor to the recipient country. We expect such trust measure
to affect investment decisions, and the associated knowledge capital, differently across
types of foreign investors. In particular this effect is expected to be stronger for in-
dustrial investors, which possess transferable knowledge capital. The data confirm
our predictions. Higher trust increases the number and volume of FDIs, but also the
probability of co-investing with a partner from the recipient country.
JEL CODES: F21, F23, G32, Z1.
KEYWORDS: Foreign Direct Investments. Trust. Knowledge Capital. Ownership Structure.
Cultural Values.
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1 Introduction
The importance of bilateral trust among nations for economic outcomes has been object
of a recent and growing literature (see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) for a survey).
These studies build on the seminal intuition by Arrow (1974) that trust is a fundamental
determinant of human behavior which shapes economic transactions and affects organiza-
tional efficiency.
Studies at the macroeconomic level have established a positive relationship between
trust among nations and economic growth (e.g., Knack and Keefer (1997), Temple and
Johnson (1998), and Zak and Knack (2001)).1 Algan and Cahuc (2014) provide a com-
prehensive survey of this literature.
At the microeconomic level, studies have shown the importance of bilateral trust for
specific economic outcomes: the volume and synergies of cross-border mergers (Ahern,
Daminelli, and Fracassi (2015)), the contractual structure of syndicated loans (Giannetti
and Yafeh (2012)), the degree of individuals’ stock market participation (Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales (2008)), and the structure and success of venture capital investments (Bot-
tazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2016)). These studies document that bilateral trust affects
both the intensity of transactions and the way they are structured, for example in terms
of contractual clauses or pricing elements.
In a recent contribution, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009), using European data,
show the importance of bilateral trust for the aggregate volume of FDI. Studying FDI
is particularly salient, as they have long overtaken trade as the main engine of product
market globalization. At the same time their work on aggregate data suggests that it
might be fruitful to build on the above microeconomic studies, and learn more about how
cultural values shape the structure of FDIs.
Our contribution takes it from here. We start by observing the increasing relevance
of firm-specific intangible assets for foreign investments and the central role of foreign
subsidiaries (the ’FDI companies’) in the circulation of knowledge within multinational
companies (Rugman and Verbeke (2001)). Intangibility implies that the investor commit-
1The relatively homogeneous economies of the European Union have attracted several studies of the
effects of trust on macroeconomic activity, both at regional and at national level (e.g., Forte, Peiró-
Palomino, and Tortosa-Ausina (2015)).
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ting assets to a foreign environment, and possibly to a co-investor, assumes considerable
risk of leakage of internal knowledge beyond firm boundaries (Carr, Markusen, and Mak-
sus (2001)). Such risk is expected to be larger for corporate (’industrial’) investors, which
commit knowledge and intangible assets to a greater extent than financial or individual
investors. This brings into play trust from the investor country to the destination country
(’origin-to-destination’ trust), as investors must trust in the possibility to realize the gains
from trade they are investing for.
In this paper we therefore ask how origin-to-destination trust affects the structure of
FDIs, focussing on two issues. First, we ask whether the effect of origin-to-destination
trust on FDI flows depends on the type of the investor, which reflects its technological
and managerial capabilities. The economic literature points to the importance of the
ownership of FDI companies, as corporate investors are more likely to transfer valuable
technology and managerial practices than financial or individual investors (Bloom, Sadun,
and van Reenen (2012)). Second, we examine whether origin-to-destination trust affects
the likelihood of observing different ownership structures for FDI companies, and specif-
ically the presence of destination country co-investors. We also ask whether such effect
also varies with the type of the investor. A co-investor from the destination country can
provide assets complementary to those of the foreign investor, especially knowledge of the
local market, but it also exposes the foreign investor to the risk of leakages of intangible
knowledge. We develop our hypotheses for these two mechanisms in Section 2.
To bring our hypotheses to the data, we build an original sample of over 30,000 intra-
European FDI companies created from 2000 to 2006 from the Amadeus database. An
important feature of such data is that we are able to identify the controlling (’ultimate’)
owners of each company. We are also able to obtain information on their nationality and
their nature as industrial company, financial company, or individual person. We use the
total number and the cumulative size of these companies as complementary proxies of
the stock of FDI companies at country pair level. We also identify the presence of co-
investors of different type as a measure of the ownership structure of the FDI company.
Such detailed data allow us to generate novel results on aspects that had not previously
been analyzed.
Our results show that origin-to-destination trust is important for the structure of FDIs.
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In particular, we find that the effect of trust on the stock of FDIs obtains primarily when
the investor is industrial. This is important, because corporates make larger investments,
often in high-tech manufacturing industries. These effects are economically appreciable.
For industrial investors, a change in origin-to-destination trust from the first to the third
quartile (which approximately corresponds to one standard deviation change in trust)
leads to a median increase in the number of investments in FDI companies between 4.5
(OLS) and 12 (IV). Also for industrial investors, a one percentage point change in origin-
to-destination trust leads to an increase between 5.7% (OLS) and 8.2% (IV) in total
size of bilateral investments in FDI companies. Computed at the average size of bilateral
investments by industrial investors, this increase amounts to betweeen 113 and 162 million
euros, which is how much Denmark invested in Italy or Belgium over our sample period.
Origin-to-destination trust also makes industrial investors more likely to find a co-investor
in the destination country, therefore facilitating the capture of strategic complementarities.
Since we employ empirical methods that address the endogeneity of bilateral trust, we can
claim to uncover a genuinely causal effect of trust on FDI decisions.
In the rest of the paper we first develop a conceptual framework that draws on eco-
nomics and management studies to build the hypotheses that we bring to the data. We
then describe the construction of our sample. We start the empirical analysis by examining
the data at the descriptive level, documenting some novel stylized facts. After discussing
our econometric methodology, we test our hypotheses and discuss our results and their
implications.
2 Trust among nations, ownership, and FDI
2.1 The economics perspective on FDI
Transaction cost economics (Coase (1937)) has been the first framework for interpreting
FDI. Its view is that organizations optimize their behavior by relying on market transac-
tions when available, but by internalizing them within their boundaries when markets for
inputs, skills, or services, are imperfect. Market imperfections may arise due to market
failures or contract incompleteness, and create uncertainty about how transactions can be
completed, leading to transaction costs such as information, enforcement, and bargain-
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ing costs (Teece (1986), Williamson (1975)). These inefficiencies may be mitigated by
organizing a firm’s activities internally, under common ownership. In the international
context, firms may choose between direct ownership of foreign subsidiaries versus trading
or operating through a joint-venture with other co-investors.
The property rights theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore
(1990)) takes a similar view, stressing the importance of asset specificity rather than of
transaction costs. It predicts that assets which are difficult to contract upon get organized
under common ownership, so as to avoid hold-up threats by separate owners. The strong
uncertainty surrounding FDIs therefore makes them a good testing ground for the effects
of origin-to-destination trust on investment and organizational choices.
More recently, explicitly knowledge-based theories of cross-border investments have
examined directly the importance of knowledge and intangible assets for FDI decisions
(Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001), Yeaple (2003)). These theories incorporate foreign
investment decisions that address both ’vertical’ (up- and down-stream) and ’horizontal’
(cross-country expansion) integration challenges taking into account the risk of leakage of
internal knowledge beyond firm boundaries.
Economists have documented that companies with foreign investors typically have
higher productivity, measured by either output per worker or total factor productivity, and
that such productivity channel trickles down to the country level (Aitken and Harrison
(1999), Alcácer and Chung (2007), Raff, Ryan, and Stahler (2012)). Greenaway and
Kneller (2007) survey this literature. This ‘own plant’ effect can be even larger than
the ‘spillover’ effect that motivates common joint ownership policies like that of China
(Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2010)).2 Both the ‘own plant’ and the ‘spillover’ effects
have been found to be heterogenous since they depend on the amount of assets foreign
investors possess and on their willingness to transfer them to organizations located outside
of their own countries (Zhang et al. (2010)). These assets, including technological and
organizational capabilities, are largely intangible and their cross-border transfer is prone to
leakage of internal knowledge outside firm boundaries. Such leakages might be especially
harmful for corporate investors, which are characterized by a high degree of complexity
2Whereas there is abundant empirical evidence suggesting a positive statistical association between
foreign ownership and productivity, the debate is still open on whether this association can be given a
causal interpretation. See Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006) for a discussion.
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and asset specificity.
2.2 The importance of ownership for FDI
The economics of the FDI decision has made considerable progress in the past two decades,
exploring the nature of the investment itself, and on the role of costs, benefits, and knowl-
edge intensity. The ownership structure of the investment itself has instead received much
less attention, and new evidence about the relevance of ownership can potentially bring
us new important insights into the economics of FDI. We consider two dimensions of
ownership.
First, we argue that different types of shareholders have different objectives and dif-
ferent constraints, which are likely to shape how origin-to-destination trust affects their
decision whether to invest or not. We consider three types of investors: industrial com-
panies, financial companies, and individuals. In Europe, ownership is quite concentrated
and the two most frequent blockholders are industrial companies or individuals and their
families (Faccio and Lang (2002)). Individual ownership is characterized by a higher de-
gree of risk aversion, less diversified investments (Fama and Jensen (1985)), and by a
more limited access to financial, technological, and managerial resources and capabilities
(Allen and Phillips (2000), Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)). Individuals (and their fami-
lies) often employ non-monetary objectives in managing their businesses, e.g., nepotism or
family legacy (Bertrand and Schoar (2006)). By contrast, industrial and financial owners
are primarily motivated by financial returns.
Second, investors have to choose between whole or joint ownership of the subsidiary,
and in the latter case on which partner they want to team up with. This choice is not
new to international investment studies (Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), Desai, Foley, and
Hines (2004a)). However, the literature has so far neglected the moderating role of cul-
tural values, and of trust in particular. This is important, as co-investors bring different
competencies and assets to the venture (Mani, Antia, and Rindfleisch (2007)), and the
role of a co-investor from the destination country may well be different from that of a
co-investor from the origin country (Tan and Mayer (2011)). Foreign investors look for
destination country co-investors able to contribute to the FDI company’s assets, capabil-
ities, and resources that cannot be otherwise acquired on the market because of market
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failures such as contract incompleteness (Raff, Ryan, and Stahler (2009)). The probabil-
ity of choosing a destination country co-investor then increases with the importance of
local assets in the production process. At the same time, the level of ownership of the
foreign investor increases with the use of proprietary and intangible assets (Gatignon and
Anderson (1988), Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004b)).
2.3 Trust, ownership, and FDI
We now draw trust into the picture. Drawing on the above discussions, we argue that
the FDI decision and the structure of the investment are likely to be affected by the
investor’s trust in the possibility to realize a large return. ‘Personalized’ trust is relevant
to relational contracts where repeated interactions reveal to the parties information about
each other (Greif (1993)), so that trust is generated within the relationship. By contrast,
‘generalized’ trust reflects a stereotypical view of others that matters before personal
interactions unfold; therefore it matters in situations where members of one group start
interacting with members of another identifiable group (Durlauf and Fafchamps (2006)).
In the context of FDI, generalized trust corresponds to origin-to-destination trust, which
includes beliefs about a country’s institutions. It is important to take into account that
the effect of trust among nations, as well as the other measures of cultural distance that
we introduce in Section 3.3, is unlikely to be symmetric, as observed by several scholars.3
We therefore focus on the trust from the investor to the company country, and stress this
with the ’origin-to-destination’ label.
An implication of the importance of assets intangibility for direct investment is that
origin-to-destination trust should affect the size of aggregate bilateral FDI differentially
across investor types. We submit that higher origin-to-destination trust should positively
affect the expected return of the investment by decreasing the perceived probability of
opportunistic behavior by third parties capturing the return to the investment. Trust
among nations has been shown to favor FDI decisions (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2009)), as well as other types of cross-border investment that entail substantial intan-
gibility. These include mergers and venture capital investments (Ahern, Daminelli, and
Fracassi (2015), Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2016)); these studies provide formal
3See Shenkar (2001), Li et al. (2017), and Felbermayr and Toubal (2010), among others.
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models where origin-to-destination trust directly affects the expected profits of the cross-
border investments, either increasing total revenues or decreasing costs. Notice that the
effect of origin-to-destination trust affects organizations as well as individuals. As the
above studies show, there are a few individuals in top management positions that decide
for corporate organizations, and it is through them that trust has effect.
We therefore expect FDI companies that are characterized by a relevant transfer of
intangible proprietary assets to be located in trustworthy countries. We also expect the
probability of co-ownership with local investors to increase with the level of origin-to-
destination trust.
Our knowledge on how origin-to-destination trust affects the location and structure of
FDI companies is scant.4 This is rather unfortunate since it is highly relevant for both
policy and corporate strategy. Foreign investors’ choices contribute materially to shaping
a country’s industrial structure and ultimately to determining the specialization of its
labor force. This is even more so in emerging economies, where the industrial structure
is less consolidated and therefore its long-term dynamic can to a large extent be affected
by external factors, including FDI. Understanding how origin-to-destination trust affects
FDI location and structure decisions is therefore very important. The main reason for
such lack of empirical evidence is the need for disaggregated firm-level data with detailed
information on the ownership structure associated to each FDI company.
The effect of origin-to-destination trust on the choice of co-investor is ex-ante ambigu-
ous. Higher origin-to-destination trust reduces the cultural distance between two coun-
tries, so that the need for a partner (and especially a local partner) becomes less pressing.
By contrast, higher origin-to-destination trust also reduces the likelihood of conflicts of
interests among partners. When the investment encompasses the transfer of intellectual
property, technological and managerial know-how, the prevention of appropriation by
partners is costly (Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004a)). If trust reduces such monitoring and
coordination costs, it may increase the probability of observing international partnerships
with local co-investors (Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen (2012)).
We submit that the conflict- and risk-reducing effect is more likely to matter for in-
4For exceptions see the studies by Fernández and Nieto (2006), for Spanish SMEs, and Zahra (2003)
for US manufacturing firms.
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vestors that contribute technological and managerial capabilities at risk of expropriation.
Industrial investors are more involved in R&D activities and transfers of technology and
managerial capabilities (Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)), and thus the cost reducing-role
of origin-to-destination trust is more important for them. For individual and financial
investors, by contrast, we expect origin-to-destination trust to decrease the probability of
partnerships with local co-investors through its direct effect on cultural distance discussed
above.
2.4 Hypotheses
Based on these considerations, we are going to test the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The level of origin-to-destination trust positively affects the number
and volume of bilateral FDIs. This effect is expected to be heterogeneous across types of
investors in the foreign entity, and should matter more for types of investors that have
stronger technological and managerial capabilities.
Hypothesis 2: The effect of origin-to-destination trust on the co-investment decision is
ambiguous and depends on the trade-off between the direct negative effect of the reduction
in cultural distance and the indirect positive effect that the reduction in cultural distance
has on the risk of expropriation. This combined effect is expected to be heterogeneous
across types of investors in the FDI companies since we expect the second effect to matter
more for types of investors that have stronger technological and managerial capabilities.
3 Data and variables
In this section we describe how we construct our sample and the variables we employ in
the analysis. Definitions and sources for all variables are reported in Table 1.
3.1 Sample construction
We build a unique, novel dataset from multiple sources. Our main source is the Amadeus
database published by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. Amadeus collects informa-
tion on a very large sample of public and private companies across all European countries.
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Data are collected from local providers that source information from repositories of ac-
counting information filed according to national regulations. Amadeus then harmonizes
the accounting information in a common format and includes additional information on
industry activity codes, legal form, ownership structure, and date of incorporation. This
database is increasingly used in scholarly research in different fields (e.g., Belenzon and
Berkovitz (2010), Da Rin, Di Giacomo, and Sembenelli (2011), Erel, Jang, and Weisbach
(2015)).
We identify in Amadeus all companies that incorporated in the years from 2000 to
2006 in one of the following 17 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK.5 Our sample therefore includes information about
FDIs done over several years and countries. Europe is a relatively uniform economy where
cross-border investments are less constrained by regulations than in other economic areas,
and therefore provides a suitable testing ground for our hypotheses (see Borchert, Gootiiz,
and Mattoo (2014)). We include companies that operate in all industries, except for the
primary sector and financial services. The number of firms complying with these initial
requirements is around 3.5 million.
For each of these companies, we identify all the Global Ultimate Owners (GUOs)
reported in the December 2008 release of the database. GUOs are persons or legal entities
with an ownership of at least 25% of the company. Amadeus reconstructs ultimate owners
using a variety of public and commercial sources (see Franks et al. (2012)). We retain
only those firms that have at least one European foreign GUO; if there is more than one
foreign GUO, we consider the country of the GUO with the largest ownership stake.6
Additionally, we exploit the available information on the type of a company’s GUO. In
the Amadeus database, each shareholder is classified according to a category. We aggre-
gate these into three types: financial company (bank, financial firm, insurance company,
mutual and pension fund, private equity firm); industrial company (all companies that are
5These countries are those in the EU15 group, with the addition of Norway and Switzerland that do
not belong to the European Union.
6 In 124 cases there are more foreign GUOs with the same ownership share from different countries. In
these cases we drop the observation. In unreported regressions, we include these observations by assigning
each of them alternatively to the country of the first or of the second investor, as identified by their
alphabetic order. None of our results are affected.
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not in the set of financial shareholders, and are involved in manufacturing or services);
individuals.7
We assume that firm ownership as recorded in 2008 reflects the ownership at incorpora-
tion. This assumption is supported by evidence that ownership in European privately-held
companies moves very slowly. Franks et al. (2012) report that in the UK, which has one
of the most active markets for corporate control, a privately-owned family firm has a 75%
probability at incorporation of remaining controlled by the same family forty years later
and a 30% probability of this persisting 150 years later. By comparison, we observe our
firms for about half a dozen years only.8
Our final sample consists of 33,040 FDI companies. The number of foreign-owned
firms in our database is about one third of the number of foreign-owned firms included in
the 2009 Eurostat FATS (Foreign Affiliates Statistics) database. Our sample differs from
FATS in two respects. First, we include only firms that incorporated between 2000 and
2006. Second, Eurostat adopts a 50% foreign ownership threshold, while we use a 25%
threshold. The Appendix (Table A.1 and Figure A.1) reports additional information to
compare these two data sources. The 25% ownership threshold is an additional point of
departure from the analysis of Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009), who employ OECD
data based on a 10% ownership threshold. As pointed out by Griffith (1999) and Lipsey
(2003), this leads to including some purely financial investments.
3.2 Dependent variables
We build our dependent variables using company-level data. We build two sets of depen-
dent variables, one that characterizes FDI companies, and one that characterizes the type
and nationality of foreign co-investors in these companies.
The first set of dependent variables is obtained by aggregating investments by origin
and destination country couples–for example the total number of FDIs from the Nether-
lands to Italy. We build two complementary measures of bilateral stocks of FDI. First, we
7Amadeus also includes the following shareholder categories: public authorities (states, governments,
foundation and research institutes); employees, managers, and directors. These owners represent only 5%
of the GUOs in our sample, and we drop all companies with such GUOs as the main foreign owner.
8Listed firms, which display larger movements in ownership structure (Foley and Greenwood (2010)),
represent less than 1% of our sample.
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compute the count of investments from an origin country to a destination country over
the 2000-2006 period (COUNT—FDI). Second, we compute the sum of total FDI assets
over all companies from an origin country to a destination country over the 2000-2006
period (SIZE—FDI). Panels A and B of Table 2 report cross-tabulated data on bilateral
FDI counts and size, respectively. Total assets are measured in the first year after incor-
poration and they are meant to measure the economic initial size of investments (Da Rin,
Di Giacomo, and Sembenelli (2010)).
We use both a count and a size measure as dependent variables because they provide
information on different aspects of FDI. The number of investments is informative about
the intensity of bilateral investment flows, while the size variable is informative about their
nature and their magnitude.
Data on total assets one year after incorporation are available for only 60% of the
companies in our sample. This is the case since balance sheet data for recently incorporated
companies are less routinely available since at this early stage in their life many of these
are still very small firms, and therefore are not required to disclose much accounting
information. To check that this claim holds in our dataset, we computed the median
value of total assets for those firms with data in the second, but not in the first, year
after incorporation. The computed median value of total assets for these firms turns
out to be about one tenth of the median value of total assets for firms with information
the first year after incorporation. We infer from this that companies with missing initial
size information are indeed very small, and adopt the following conservative imputation
strategy. We compute the 5th percentile in the initial distribution of total assets for
manufacturing and services firms separately, and we impute these values–20,580 euros
for manufacturing and 8,000 euros for services–to firms with missing size information,
according to their respective sector. These values are then used to compute our aggregate
SIZE—FDI variable.9
The second set of dependent variables consists of three binary indicators that we use
in the company-level analysis. First, we identify firms where the main (foreign) investor
has a co-investor (CO-INVESTOR). A single foreign investor (GUO) owns on average
9The 5th percentile corresponds to one tenth of the median. As robustness check we have also replicated
all our equations with SIZE-FDI as dependent variable by setting all missing values equal to zero. All
findings discussed in section 6.1 are fully robust to this alternative imputation strategy.
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86% of the firm. This figure falls to 50% when there is a co-investor, whose share is on
average 35%. Since a co-investor may be either foreign or domestic (i.e. from the same
country of the FDI company), we distinguish between whether the co-investor is from the
country of destination (CO-INVESTOR—DESTINATION) or from the country of origin
(CO-INVESTOR—ORIGIN).
3.3 Independent variables and instruments
We use several bilateral distance measures as our explanatory variables and instruments.
Our main explanatory variable (TRUST) is the measure of origin-to-destination trust
among nations (‘bilateral trust’) derived from the Eurobarometer survey and described by
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009). The survey asks whether respondents have ‘a lot of
trust,’ ‘some trust,’ ‘not very much trust’ or ‘no trust at all’ in citizens of different countries.
Following Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen (2012) and Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann
(2016), we define TRUST to be the percentage of respondents in a given member country,
declaring ‘a lot of trust’ in people from another member country, averaged over the survey
waves from 1970 to 1995. We report data on origin-to-destination trust in Table A.2 of the
Appendix. The data conform to expected patterns. For instance, Scandinavian countries
exhibit the highest trust values: Danish, Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian people have
very high trust among each others. On average, the least trusted country is Italy, while
the most trustworthy is Switzerland. Conversely, Portugal is the least trusting country,
and Sweden is the most trusting one. Importantly, TRUST shows high persistence over
time and high correlation with other measures of social capital.10 This suggests a reliable
measure of trust, that reflects expected patterns among nations that remain stable over
time.
As control variables we consider a set of regressors which measure the distance between
the country of the investor and the country of the company. These variables include four
historically predetermined distance variables. CONTIGUITY is a binary indicator that
identifies country pairs sharing a common border. DISTANCE is the logarithm of the dis-
10Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2016) report a significant 0.72 correlation coefficient between the
Eurobarometer measure and another widely used measure of trust, the World Value Survey measure
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org) of trust in people of the same country. They also provide evidence of high
correlation of bilateral trust measured across Eurobarometer waves.
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tance from two countries’ largest cities. These two variables capture transportation costs.
COMMON—LANGUAGE is a binary indicator for country pairs sharing the same official
primary language. SAME—LEGAL—ORIGIN is a binary indicator for country pairs that
share the same legal origin (common law or civil law, see La Porta et al. (1998)). These
two variables proxy for contracting and negotiation costs, as it is reasonable to expect
that a common language and a similar legal system may facilitate economic transactions.
In our robustness checks we also use PRESS-COVERAGE which counts the number
of times a country’s name appears in the headlines of another country’s major newspaper.
This variable proxies for costs associated with information barriers, for search costs, and
for familiarity with the destination country.
In the extensions of the baseline analysis we introduce two additional sets of variables.
The first set includes two measures of distance between countries that are meant to measure
additional (comparative) costs of cross-border investments due to taxation and labor costs.
We compute the corporate tax differential, TAX—DIFF, as the logarithm of one plus the
absolute value of the difference in corporate tax rates between the investor’s country and
the FDI company’s country, averaged over the 2000-2006 period. Similarly, the differential
in labour cost, LAB—COST—DIFF, is the logarithm of one plus the absolute value of the
difference in hourly labour cost between the investor’s country and the company’s country,
averaged over the 2000-2006 period. These variables are not included in the baseline
specifications since they are potentially jointly determined with the FDI decision. We
rather add them in subsequent—less parsimonious— specifications to check the robustness
of our main results when standard economic factors are also included.
The second set of additional explanatory variables includes measures of distance in the
cultural space. We include these variables with the purpose of ruling out the possibility
that TRUST may simply proxy for underlying cultural factors omitted in our baseline
specifications. Cultural values are an intrinsically multidimensional concept, some dimen-
sions of which are potentially correlated—and could even be observationally equivalent—to
TRUST. For this, we borrow from two recent studies which look at the role played by
cultural differences in values and practices on cross-border mergers (Ahern, Daminelli,
and Fracassi (2015)) and on FDI (Li et al. (2017)). We proxy distance in cultural values
with two variables developed in theoretical work by Fiske (1991) and Hofstede (1980).
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HIERARCHY measures the difference between two countries in the propensity to follow
the rules and orders by higher authorities and to defer to authorities to settle disputes.
INDIVIDUALISM measures the difference between two countries in the degree to which
individuals are viewed as autonomous in their power of self-determination, rather than
members of a larger social group whose collective welfare is determining decisions. Both
measures have been widely used in economics, psychology, and sociology as key dimension
of national cultural values (see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) for a survey). A high
difference in hierarchical and individualistic values is likely to discourage investment, as it
hampers cooperation between foreign investors and local workforce.
An alternative approach is to consider cultural attractiveness as a distance measure.
Cultural attractiveness is defined as ’the desirability of a culture for members of another
culture, based on the extent to which the former culture’s practices reflect the latter
culture’s values’ (Li et al. (2017)). The measure of cultural attractiveness developed by Li
et al. (2017) uses data on the behavioral patterns and practices of a national culture and on
what members of different cultures find desirable that are found in the GLOBE database
(House et al. (2004)). We use their measure of CULTURAL-ATTRACTIVENESS, which
is a multidimensional bilateral indicator of cultural attractiveness. The salient feature of
this measure is that it is a weighted index of the distance between a set of cultural values
of the origin country and the corresponding set of cultural practices of the destination
country.
Finally, since TRUST might be endogenous to our measures of bilateral FDIs, we
make use of three additional bilateral variables as instruments: SOMATIC-DISTANCE,
GENETIC-DISTANCE and RELIGIOUS-SIMILARITY. The first two variables measure
distance among countries on the basis of differences in somatic traits and in prevailing
genes, respectively, whereas the third is based on the commonality in religious beliefs
among citizens of each pair of countries. We discuss them further in section 5.1.
4 Descriptive evidence
An advantage of using company-level data is that it allows us to use company attributes
to define the sample and partition it into different subsets of firms.
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4.1 Sample characteristics by investor type
In Table 3 we look at the distribution of FDI companies by investor (GUO) type, both
for the aggregate and for the subsets of high-tech manufacturing industries or knowledge-
intensive services. Overall, 90% of FDI companies are in services and this share is relatively
stable across types of owners. This closely mimics the structure of the data in the full
Amadeus database, where the share of firms in services is nearly 80%. As expected,
the largest category of ultimate owners is industrial, accounting for half of the sample.
Individuals make up nearly a third of sample. Only one in six investors is financial. When
we further disaggregate the data we find that 42% of the FDI companies in manufacturing
are high-tech, while 62% of the FDI companies in services are in knowledge-intensive
services.
More importantly for the purpose of this paper, when we look at the industry decom-
position of these FDI companies, we observe heterogeneity in the behavior of different
investors. More precisely, there are stark differences between industrial and individual
investors, with financial ones being somewhat in between. First, in terms of sector com-
position, industrial investors are more attracted by manufacturing than other investors;
they are also more likely to invest in high-tech industries. Differences across investors are
less pronounced for FDI companies in services. In this case it is financial investors that
invest more in knowledge-intensive companies. Also, proportionally more companies are
in knowledge-intensive services than in high-tech manufacturing. Second, the differences
across investors become starker in terms of initial size. FDI companies in manufacturing
are over five times larger than those in services. The median initial size of FDI companies
owned by industrial and financial investors is about five times higher than for companies
owned by individual investors. This pattern is even more marked for companies in the
manufacturing sector. Overall, industrial investors own larger companies that operate
frequently in high-tech manufacturing. Individual investors exhibit an opposite behavior.
This provides us with prima facie evidence that different types of investors own different
types of FDI companies.
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4.2 Sample characteristics by investor type and co-investor location
Table 4 further explores these differences by including information on the number and
type of other ultimate owners of FDI companies (co-investors). Panel A reports data for
the whole sample, and Panels B, C, and D for each subset of ultimate owners.
From Panel A we see that most FDI companies only have one ultimate owner. Only
6% of the companies experience the presence of a co-investor, whose origin is evenly split
between the destination and the origin countries. There are no strong differences in the
sectorial distribution for companies with or without a co-investor, only a slightly larger
presence of co-investors in high-tech manufacturing and a lower presence in knowledge-
intensive services. Interestingly, the median initial size is 35% lower when a co-investor is
present, and this effect is stronger when the co-investor is from the destination country.
Panels B, C, and D document a marked difference between industrial and financial in-
vestors compared to individual ones also when it comes to co-investment decisions. Indus-
trial and financial ultimate owners co-invest in less than 4% of the cases, while individuals
in over 10% of the cases. In most cases the co-investor is of the same type as the main
ultimate owner.
When the ultimate owner is an individual, in 97% of the cases the co-investor is also
an individual.11 When the ultimate owner is an industrial company, the co-investor is
also an industrial company in 77% of the cases. When the ultimate owner is a financial
company, the co-investor is also a financial entity in 70% of the cases.
Another notable difference is that industrial and financial investors have more co-
investors from the destination country than from the origin country, while the reverse
is true for individual investors. No consistently strong patterns are discernible when
comparing characteristics of investments made with a co-investor from the destination or
from the origin country, except that the FDI company size is somewhat larger in the latter
case. For all ultimate owner types, a larger share of manufacturing companies is associated
with the presence of a co-investor, even if these are not necessarily more technology-
intensive. Finally, median initial size is considerably larger when the co-investor is from
11As imperfect as it may be, we checked for identical surnames in the lists of the largest ultimate
individual owner and of the co-investors. We find that 23% of the co-investors belong to the same family
of the main ultimate owner. We re-estimate our regressions by excluding these companies and we find that
the main results are unchanged.
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the origin country. We return to these stylized facts in section 6.
4.3 Empirical distribution of variables
Panels A and B of Table 5 report descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory
variables, respectively, aggregated at the country pair level.12 In Panel A we report the
cumulative count and size of FDIs for each country pair by type of ultimate owner. In
the whole sample, the median number of investments between two countries is 22, while
the average is 131, suggesting a right-skewed distribution. The distribution has similar
patterns across investor types, with industrials characterized by a much larger number of
investments. The dispersion is high for both financial and individual ultimate owners.
Panel A of Table 5 also presents statistics for FDI company size. In the whole sample,
the median total size is 151 million euros, mainly reflecting the large size of FDI companies
with an industrial ultimate owner. Companies with a financial or individual ultimate owner
show much lower size values across the whole distribution.
Panel B of Table 5 reports country pair level descriptive statistics for independent
variables. The average trust measure is 21% (median 18%), meaning that on average,
21% of people declare lot of trust in other countries’ population. There is substantial
variation in the amount of trust across country pairs. We observe that 11% of country
pairs share a common language, 15% share a common border, and 29% share the same
legal origin. Finally, we notice that the number of observations for all other variables is
somewhat more limited due to data unavailability for HIERARCHY, INDIVIDUALISM,
CULTURAL—ATTRACTIVENESS, and PRESS—COVERAGE. 13
5 Methodology
5.1 The relationship between trust and FDI
In this section we outline our empirical strategy. The models we propose can be viewed
as extensions of the standard Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) specification for gravity
12We deal with 17 destination countries and 16 origin countries, so we potentially have 256 observations,
as we need to exclude cells within the same country. Since TRUST is not available for four country pairs
(Norway with Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland), the regressions employ 252 observations.
13We report correlation coefficients among all bilateral variables in the Appendix (Table A.3).
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equations, where trade flows among two countries are expected to be related both to
bilateral and to multilateral trade resistance terms, the latter captured through importer
and exporter fixed effects. We apply this approach both to the count and to the size of
bilateral FDIs. From this perspective, our paper aligns with Head and Ries (2008) and
Sousa and Lochard (2012) which also apply a ’gravity approach’ to MAs and greenfield
FDI respectively.
In the first specification that we take to the data, the count of FDI companies for
each country pair  (origin) and  (destination) is explained by bilateral trust and a set
of additional measures of physical and cultural distance between  and . We model
COUNT—FDI as a Poisson random variable and its conditional mean is specified as an
exponential function:
E[ − |x] =  = ( +  +  + x0) (1)
where  is our bilateral trust measure, x includes a set of bilateral measures of
physical and cultural distance between  and , and  and  represent country  and
country  fixed effects, respectively.14
In order to estimate consistently our parameters of interest, reasonable identification
assumptions have to be made. In particular the potential problems arising from the endo-
geneity of  have to be addressed. Endogeneity may arise for a variety of reasons
including measurement errors, omitted variables, and simultaneity. This last problem may
occur because of reverse causality. This would be the case if, for example, trust increases
when more foreign investments take place. The omission of relevant variables occurs if
we omit from equation (1) unobserved or unobservable variables which are related to
 and affect  − . Finally,  may be measured with error.
Many different proxies for trust have been suggested in the literature (see Glaeser et al.
(2000)), and probably none of them is able to fully and accurately measure the behavior
or attitude we aim at capturing.
14As pointed out by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) impose unit
income elasticities by dividing the dependent variable by the product of the countries’ GDP. Since we
are working with cross-sectional data and the model specification includes destination country and origin
country fixed effects, income elasticities cannot be identified and therefore there is no need to impose
restrictions on them.
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We deal with these three endogeneity concerns in different ways. Firstly, we make
a preliminary step towards addressing the simultaneity problem by measuring 
over the years 1970-1995, that is well before firms in our sample were incorporated (2000-
2006). In such a way,  can be taken as predetermined with respect to −
.
Secondly, we experiment with different sets of bilateral covariates in  with the
purpose of checking whether the sign and the size of the estimated parameter of interest,
 are robust to the inclusion of several observable, and potentially relevant, economic and
cultural factors.
Thirdly, we recognize that, even after controlling for a large set of observables, 
could still suffer from the omission of unobservable relevant factors or from measure-
ment error. To address this additional concern, we estimate an IV-Poisson version of
equation (1). We follow Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) and employ two instru-
mental variables for  measured at the country pair level. The first variable,
 − , is an index measure of the somatic dissimilarity (height,
hair, skin) between country pairs. The second variable, −,
is the probability that two randomly chosen individuals in two countries share the same
religion.
The identification assumption we make is that somatic and religious differences do not
affect FDIs directly, but only through trust. Indeed, while religious and somatic differences
are found to be relevant determinants of , Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009)
provide compelling historical reasons for why they should be excluded from equation (1).
First,  −  is unlikely to have a direct effect on FDI, unless it
proxies for well established routes of communication. This is unlikely to be the case since
somatic differences reflect the history of ancient migrations from Asia and Africa to Europe,
which are unlikely to be correlated with today’s FDI patterns. Second, the religious roots of
most European countries are the result of religious persecutions and royal conversions and
impositions. The commonality of religion ( −  ) is therefore
unlikely to explain current FDI bilateral flows, especially once common borders, common
language and geographic distance are accounted for.15
15 In section 6 we also explore the relevance and the validity of a third instrument, which is often used in
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We then investigate whether trust also affects the size of bilateral FDI activities. We
estimate the following model, where the dependent variable SIZE-FDI is the amount of
total assets (at incorporation) of FDI companies established in country  in the 2000-2006
period, owned by investors from country :
E[ − | z] = ( +  +  + x0ς) (2)
where the variables and symbols are the same as in equation (1). The estimation of equa-
tion (2) poses serious econometric challenges since the standard approach of taking logs
and then estimating the transformed model with OLS involves making strong assump-
tions on the functional form of the transformed error. The violation of this assumption
leads, in turn, to inconsistent estimates of the parameter of interest in the log-transformed
model (Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)). In addition, the existence of observations for
which the dependent variable is zero creates an obvious additional problem for the use
of the log-transformation approach. For this reason several Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
(PML) approaches have been suggested in the recent empirical literature.16 Since each of
these methods has its advantages and disadvantages, which depend on the sample size and
on the empirical distribution of the variables of interest, we follow Manning and Mullay
(2001) and estimate equation (2) with several estimators to establish robustness. These
include OLS and GMM on the log-transformed model and Poisson and Gamma PML on
the original multiplicative gravity model.
In order to test Hypothesis 1 that trust may differently affect investors of different
type, we estimate models (1) and (2) both on the whole sample and on the three sub-
samples of industrial, financial and individual ultimate owners. We expect the signs for 
and  to be positive. Furthermore, since investors differ in their degree of managerial and
technological expertise, we also expect the size for  and  to be larger for the sub-sample
of industrial investors.
the literature, −. This is an index measure of the genetic dissimilarity between
country pairs and is defined in Table 1.
16Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) advocate the use of the so-called Poisson PML approach. Head
and Mayer (2014), in the context of gravity equations, and Manning and Mullahy (2001), more generally,
propose instead to report a "robustness-exploring ensemble" of estimators, including OLS performed on
the log-transformed model, Poisson PML and Gamma PML.
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5.2 Co-investor analysis
In the second part of our analysis, we move to examine whether trust also affects the
ownership structure of FDI companies. Following Hypothesis 2, we expect the propensity
towards co-ownership of FDI companies to depend on the degree of bilateral trust when
the potential co-investor is from the FDI company’s country. To test this hypothesis we
exploit firm-level information on ownership, and we estimate a variety of binary response
models which share the same basic structure:
( = 1|w) = Φ( +  +  +  +w0) (3)
where  indexes firms,  destination country,  origin country,  incorporation year and Φ
is the normal cumulative distribution function. The binary dependent variable  is equal
to 1 if the co-investor is from the same country as the FDI company (− −
), and 0 if there is no co-investor. Observations with a co-investor not
from the destination country are dropped in estimation. Among the independent variables,
we include  and a set of measures of physical and cultural distance w.  and
 represent country  and country  fixed effects, respectively, while  embodies fixed
effects for the incorporation year.
The sign of  in equation (3) is ambiguous. Higher trust is expected to reduce the
cultural distance between the two countries and therefore the need for a partner. On
the other hand, trust might also reduce the potential conflicts of interest among the two
partners and therefore increase the incentive to find a co-investor from the destination
country. This second mechanism is more likely to apply to investors which transfer more
managerial and technological capabilities, so we expect  to be larger in the sub-sample
of industrial investors.
In order to test the robustness of our results, we also estimate equation (3) after
replacing  −   −  with an alternative binary variable
which is equal to 1 if the co-investor is from the same country as the investor and 0 if
there is no co-investor (−  −).17 We do so in order to provide
indirect evidence that the channel through which bilateral trust affects the probability of
17 In this specification observations not from the origin country are instead dropped in estimation.
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co-ownership is specific to partnerships between co-owners of different nationalities and
does not reflect a spurious correlation which applies to all joint ownerships.
6 Results
6.1 Trust and FDIs
In this section we test Hypothesis 1 on the role of trust in FDI decisions. Table 6 reports
results of estimates of equation (1) for COUNT—FDI. We first estimate the effect of trust
for the whole sample and then separately for each type of investor: industrial, financial, and
individual. In odd-numbered columns we report the estimates from Poisson regressions.
The results show TRUST to have a positive and statistically significant effect for the
whole sample. The effect is fully due to industrial investors. A one percentage point
increase in TRUST leads to an increase in the number of FDI companies of 1.9% in
the industrial investors sub-sample (column (3)). Given the non linearity of the Poisson
model, we report at the bottom of the Table the marginal effect at different percentiles
of its own distribution. The economic significance of the effect of TRUST turns out to
be economically large. For industrial investors, a change in TRUST from the first to the
third quartile (i.e. from 12% to 26%, which approximately corresponds to one standard
deviation change), leads to a median increase in COUNT-FDI of 4.5. This is a sizeable
effect given a median value of COUNT—FDI of 22.
The estimates for the other regressors are largely as predicted. CONTIGUITY and
SAME—LEGAL—ORIGIN positively affect COUNT—FDI. The relative difference in the
number of FDI companies, between countries with a common border and countries without
common borders is around 0.3% for industrial and financial investors, while it rises to 1.2%
for individuals. The relative difference in the number of FDI companies, between countries
with the same legal origin and countries with different legal origin, is close to 1% for all
investors’ types. As expected, DISTANCE has a negative effect on FDI activity: a one
percentage point increase in distance lowers the count of FDI companies by about 0.7%,
for all types of investors. Sharing a common language does not affect COUNT—FDI.
We report the instrumental variables Poisson estimates in the even-numbered columns
of Table 6. Table 7 reports results from the first stage regression, which points to the
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relevance of SOMATIC-DISTANCE and RELIGIOUS-SIMILARITY as instruments and
exhibits good diagnostics. The effect of TRUST on COUNT—FDI retains its strong statis-
tical significance and becomes economically even larger: in column (4), a one percentage
point increase in TRUST increases the number of FDI companies by 7.8%. The median
increase in COUNT-FDI, for an increase in TRUST from the first to the third quartile,
is 12 investments. As a robustness check, we re-estimate the same set of regressions with
the inclusion of RELIGIOUS-SIMILARITY in the set of regressors. As discussed in sec-
tion 5.1, we do this even if commonality of religion is unlikely to have a direct effect on
trade, especially since we control for distance, commonality of language, and common
border. We also include in the set of instruments GENETIC-DISTANCE. In all cases our
results are virtually unchanged. Also, GENETIC-DISTANCE turns out to be a very weak
instrument.18
Tables 8 and 9 report estimates of equation (2). Columns (1) to (4) of Table 8 provide
a comparison of results from different estimation methods when equation (2) is estimated
for the whole sample. With the exception of Poisson PML, TRUST always has a positive,
and significant, effect on SIZE—FDI. Also, results for OLS on the transformed model and
for Gamma PML on the original multiplicative model are extremely close (0.056 and 0.054
respectively). This is comforting for two reasons. Firstly, it suggests that the reduction
in sample size due to the loss of observations associated to the log transformation of the
dependent variable (from 252 in column (3) to 223 in column (1)) is not a major concern
in this application. Secondly, and possibly even more importantly, it provides evidence
on the robustness of our OLS estimates to violations of the exogeneity assumption arising
from the heteroskedasticity in the transformed error term. The fact that for some of
the variables, including TRUST, estimated coefficients are instead smaller when Poisson
PML is used as estimation method should be viewed as a signal that this approach is not
appropriate in our case. This claim is supported both by the empirical evidence against the
Poisson PML constant variance-mean ratio assumption (The Manning-Mullahy estimated
heteroskedasticity parameter is very close to 2 in all columns) and by the excess kurtosis in
the distribution of the residuals (ranging from 4.2 to 5.2).19 Finally, the effects of TRUST
18We report these additional sets of results in Appendix Tables A.4 to A.6.
19Also, the Poisson PML estimator is not robust to even mild right-tail trimming. In fact the estimated
coefficient on TRUST becomes positive (= 0026 and significant at the 10% level) and therefore closer to
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in the whole sample remains significant, and becomes larger in size, after instrumentation
(0.083, column (4)).
Table 9 reports OLS estimates in odd-numbered columns and GMM estimates in even
numbered columns for our three sub-samples.20 When estimated with OLS, TRUST has a
positive, and significant, effect on SIZE—FDI for both industrial and financial investors. A
one percentage point change in TRUST corresponds to an increase in SIZE—FDI between
5.7% (for industrial investors) and 6.7% (for financial investors). The effect of TRUST in
the two sub-samples becomes even larger, after instrumentation, although it now becomes
marginally insignificant at conventional levels. Individual investors remain immune from
the influence of TRUST in volume terms, as it was the case for COUNT—FDI.21
Control variables in Tables 8 and 9 largely have the same effects as they had in Table
6, with the exception of CONTIGUITY, which becomes insignificant. Individual investors
show greater sensitivity to distance measures: a one percentage point increase in distance
reduces SIZE—FDI by 2.1% for individual investors, and by only 1% to 1.4% for finan-
cial and industrial investors, respectively. Similarly, the percent difference in SIZE—FDI
from countries with the same legal origin and countries with different legal origin, is be-
tween 0.8% and 1.4% for industrials and financial investors, while it amounts to 3.2% for
individuals.
Overall, the results from Tables 6, 8 and 9 point to a sizeable effect of TRUST on
FDI decisions. This effect holds mainly for industrial investors, and to a lesser extent for
financial ones. These findings are consistent with recent studies of the effect of TRUST
on mergers (Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2015)) and on venture capital (Bottazzi, Da
Rin, and Hellmann (2016)), which point to the importance of investor capabilities and of
potential synergies for cross-border investment to create value. Trust reduces participa-
tion costs (transaction costs, monitoring costs, bargaining costs, etc.) and the perceived
OLS and Gamma PML when estimated on a sample which excludes the upper 5% observations on the
dependent variable. The other estimation methods are instead insensitive to such trimming.
20We do not report Gamma PML estimates since convergence is not reached for the sub-samples of
financial and individual investors. This is likely to depend on the larger number of zeroes in these two
sub-samples. For the sub-sample of industrial investors—for which convergence is obtained— estimated
coefficients are once again very close to their OLS counterparts.
21We also re-estimate equation (2) with the inclusion of RELIGIOUS-SIMILARITY among regressors
and of GENETIC-DISTANCE as instrument. Results do not change noticeably. We report them in
Appendix Tables A.7 and A.8.
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probability of opportunistic behavior by third parties, thus boosting international involve-
ment, both in number and size. As industrial investors have stronger technological and
managerial capabilities at risk, they are more subject to such effect.
We interpret the fact that trust does not matter for individual investors as the result
of two possible effects: either bilateral trust does not actually enter the decision process
of such investors, as other non-monetary objectives prevail, or these owners show more
heterogeneity in their behavior, and we are not able to capture such diversity. This could
be the case, for instance, with varying degrees of involvement of family members in the
management of the firm or in their risk aversion.
6.2 Alternative data and additional determinants of FDI
An additional concern that we have to address is to rule out the possibility that our em-
pirical results depend on the way we built our dataset. This might be related to the way
we identify foreign ownership, to the sample period we refer to, or to the differences in
country coverage discussed in section 3.1. To verify whether this is the case, we replicate
the first two columns of Table 6 by using the count of bilateral FDIs reported officially by
the Eurostat FATS dataset. We report the results in Table A.9 of the Appendix. Com-
fortingly, the coefficient on TRUST is still positive and significant regardless of whether
or not we take care of the endogeneity of trust. Also, as in Table 6, the estimated para-
meter with IV-Poisson is almost twice as large compared to the parameter estimate with
standard Poisson. The marginal effects computed at different quartiles are larger, but this
is to be expected since the sample period covered by FATS is longer than ours.
A second, and possibly more worrisome, concern is that the omission of confounding
economic or cultural factors could bias the results. To address this issue we develop
two extensions of our main econometric model that incorporate additional explanatory
variables. We report the results in Tables A.10 through A.17 of the Appendix.
Firstly, we enrich the analysis with three additional variables that directly affect the
cost of the investment: the differential in corporate tax income rates between origin and
destination countries (TAX—DIFF), the differential in hourly labor costs (LAB—COST—
DIFF) and the amount of information on the destination country available through busi-
ness newspapers published in the country of origin (PRESS—COVERAGE), the latter
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proxying for information barriers and search costs. TAX—DIFF accounts for any tax
advantages that may drive FDI flows (Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005)). Similarly, LAB—
COST—DIFF accounts for labor cost advantages across countries (Braconier, Norback,
and Urban 2005)). For COUNT—FDI we find results largely consistent with those of Table
6. TRUST remains significant and with similar marginal effects as before; its effect still
mainly goes through industrial investors. TAX—DIFF has a positive, and significant, sign
for COUNT—FDI, pointing to an increasing number of FDI companies being created the
larger is the tax advantage. Interestingly, this effect is significant only for financial and
individual investors, for which the purely financial return is likely to be more important
than for industrial investors. By contrast, LAB—COST—DIFF is not significant (Table A.
10). For SIZE—FDI we find similar results—albeit slightly less precisely estimated—with the
only difference that TAX—DIFF affects only the decision of financial investors (Table A.
11). As to PRESS—COVERAGE, its inclusion does not alter the effect of TRUST. This
additional variable shows no explanatory power, as it was the case in Guiso, Sapienza,and
Zingales (2009) and Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2016). We report the results in
Tables A.12 and A.13 of the Appendix.
Secondly, we explore the robustness of our results to the inclusion of additional vari-
ables proxying for the bilateral proximity in cultural values, whose omission therefore can
potentially bias the estimated effect of TRUST on FDIs.
We start tackling this issue by including two separate dimensions of cultural values
which have been perceived as very relevant in the economic literature, INDIVIDUALISM
and HIERARCHY. We report the results of these estimates in Tables A.14 and A.15 of
the Appendix. INDIVIDUALISM is never statistically significant, but we find evidence
that bilateral distance in hierarchical values reduces the propensity to engage in FDI for
individual investors. More importantly for our analysis, the effect of TRUST remains
unabated, statistically and economically. We then replace INDIVIDUALISM and HIER-
ARCHY with CULTURAL-ATTRACTIVENESS, a multidimensional variable used in the
managerial literature. We report these results in Tables A.16 and A.17 of the Appen-
dix. CULTURAL-ATTRACTIVENESS is never significant in any of the equations for
COUNT—FDI. It is however positive, and significant, in the sub-sample of individual in-
vestors for SIZE—FDI. Also in this case the size of the coefficients on TRUST remains
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unaltered even if we observe a reduction in the precision of the instrumental variable
estimates.
6.3 Trust and the choice of a co-investor
In this section we test Hypothesis 2 by examining the role of trust in the decision to share
the ownership of the foreign subsidiary with a national of the destination country. This
is still unexplored territory, and we believe it is useful and importnat to shed light on
this issue even we recognize that, at least in our data-set, co-ownership turns out to be a
rather uncommon occurrence.
Table 10 reports results from the binary response models of equation (3) in the usual
format. We now bring the analysis at firm level, and include the over 30,000 observations
of our sample.22
We report results from standard Probit regressions in odd-numbered columns and
results from instrumented Probit regressions in even-numbered columns. Since we have
multiple observations at country pair level, in all specifications we cluster the standard
errors at the country pair level. TRUST has a negative and significant effect on the
probability of having a destination country co-investor for financial as well as for individual
investors. This effect also holds when the endogeneity of TRUST is taken into account. In
economic terms, an increase in TRUST from the first to the third quartile corresponds to
a median change in the probability of observing a destination country co-investor between
—0.03 and —0.07 (columns (6) and (8)) for financial and individual investors, respectively.
On the contrary, we find that the same probability is positively associated to TRUST for
industrial investor (column (3)) albeit this result is not robust to IV estimation (column
(4)).
These findings suggest that TRUST does indeed affect the probability of finding a co-
investor in the destination country, and that this effect is not homogenous across different
types of investors. The fact that the effect is positive for industrial investors but negative
for financial and individual investors is consistent with the idea that higher trust may bring
22The reduced number of observations is due to the presence of perfect collinearity between destination
country fixed effects and the dependent variable. For instance, in columns (1) and (2), which report results
for the full sample, we miss 11,638 observations for UK and 14 observations for Switzerland, as none of
these firms has a co-investor from the destination country.
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industrial investors to choose a co-investor from the same country of the FDI company
because it reassures them on potentially losing valuable intangible knowledge. In the case
of the other two types of investors instead TRUST seems to affect the probability through
a reduction of the incentives to share risks with local partners.
Clearly, the fact that our results match well the theoretical prediction embodied in
Hypothesis 2 is not a direct test of the existence of the economic channel we are trying to
document. A substantial step forward can be made by analyzing whether our findings also
apply to the probability of choosing a co-investor from the origin country of the investor,
or whether they are indeed specific to the choice of co-investing with a partner from the
destination country. We report estimates from this exercise in Table 11. The results
suggest that TRUST has virtually no role on the probability of having a co-investor from
the same country. The only exception is in column (6) where the coefficient on TRUST,
for financial investors, is negative and marginally significant.
Overall, therefore, we find that bilateral trust affects the probability of selecting a
co-investor from the destination country, but it plays no role in the decision to partner
with a co-investor from the origin country, i.e., the country of the main investor. While
the effect on co-investors of the destination country is heterogenous across investor types,
the effect on co-investors from the origin country applies to all types of investors. This is a
comforting result, since there is no reason why bilateral trust should affect the probability
of co-investing with a co-national partner, at least with respect to the leakage argument.
6.4 Additional determinants of co-ownership
As we already mentioned in subsection 6.2, TRUST is likely to be correlated with other
cultural variables which are expected to affect not only the number and the size of FDIs
but also the probability of selecting a co-investor from the destination country. Indeed
one can well imagine that an international main investor is more likely to match with a
local partner if the latter shares the same cultural values and the same cultural practices
of the main investor. To address this legitimate concern, we briefly discuss two additional
sets of results which we report in Table A.18 and Table A.19 of the Appendix.
We start by expanding the model specification reported in Table 10 with the inclu-
sion of INDIVIDUALISM and HIERARCHY. The latter is never statistically significant,
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but we find evidence that INDIVIDUALISM positively affects the probability of matching
with a co-investor from the destination country, even if only in the sub-sample of financial
investors. Overall, the effect of TRUST is similar in size compared to what we found in the
baseline specifications reported in Table 10 albeit it is more imprecisely estimated, espe-
cially with instrumental variables. We then replace INDIVIDUALISM and HIERARCHY
with CULTURAL-ATTRACTIVENESS. This variable turns out to be positively signifi-
cant in the equations for industrial investors, and this is the case regardless of the chosen
estimation method (probit or IV probit). More importantly, the size of the coefficients
on TRUST remains unaltered even if we observe a reduction in the precision of the IV
estimates.
Overall, we conclude that the effect of TRUST is robust to the inclusion of several
confounding cultural factors. This is definitively the case if we look at the sign and the
size of the estimated parameters but less so if we focus on the statistical significance of
the estimated parameters when we allow TRUST to be endogenous and we instrument it
accordingly.
7 Conclusion
In this study we provide a new perspective on the role of bilateral trust among nations for
foreign direct investments. Previous literature has convincingly documented the impor-
tance of trust for the size of cross-border transactions of different type, including FDIs,
mergers and venture capital. The literature is however largely silent on the ’how’ of the
role of trust. We provide a contribution in this direction by examining how trust inter-
acts with the type of investor making the foreign investment. Our results are novel and
interesting. In particular, we find that trust leads to stronger FDI activity by industrial
investors and not by financial or individual ones. This differential effect extends to the
choice of co-investor, with higher trust reducing the likelihood of a destination-country co-
investor for financial and individual investors but not for industrial ones. Our econometric
approach, based on instrumental variables, allows us to attach a causal interpretation to
these results.
These results build on recent literature on multinational investments and on their
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increasing reliance on transfers of intangible assets. They show that cultural values do
influence the more knowledge-intensive component of FDI, in an economically sizeable
way. This has important consequences for our understanding of the economic forces that
shape knowledge flows and contribute to create gains from trade. Trust among nations is a
very stable factor, that cannot be changed by public policy or by corporate behavior–at
least over sensible time horizons. For economists, the question is to delve deeper into
the structure of FDIs and further identify which organizational elements may be affected
by bilateral trust. In particular, learning about the effect of trust on contractual and
governance structures of FDI companies could further shed light on the effects of deep-
seeded cultural values.
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Table 1. Definition and sources of variables
Variable Definition and sources
COUNT–FDI Definition: Count of bilateral foreign direct investments, by coun-
try pair, made over the years from 2000 to 2006.
Source: Amadeus database, December 2008 release.
SIZE–FDI Definition: The cumulative size of bilateral FDIs, by country pair,
made over the years from 2000 to 2006. Size is measured by
company total assets, in euros, in the first year after incorporation.
Source: Amadeus database, December 2008 release.
CO–INVESTOR–
DESTINATION
Definition: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if a FDI company
has a ultimate owner from its same country, and 0 if the company
is owned by only one (foreign) owner.
Source: Amadeus database, December 2008 release.
CO–INVESTOR–
ORIGIN
Definition: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if a FDI company
has a ultimate owner from the same country of the main ultimate
owner, and 0 if the company is owned by only one (foreign) owner.
Source: Amadeus database, December 2008 release.
TRUST Definition: Percentage of citizens in the country of origin of the
FDI who declare “a lot of trust” in the citizens of the country of
destination, in the following Eurobarometer survey question: ‘I
would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have
in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether
you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no
trust at all.’ This measure is averaged over all survey waves.
Source: Eurostat Eurobarometer survey, 1970-1995.
CONTIGUITY Definition: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if two countries
share a common land border; 0 otherwise.
Source: Frankel et al. (1995).
DISTANCE Definition: Logarithm of the kilometric distance between the two
most populated cities a pair of countries.
Source: Frankel et al. (1995).
COMMON–LANGUAGE Definition: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if two countries
share the same main official language; 0 otherwise.
Source: Jon Haveman’s website at Macalester University.
SAME–LEGAL–ORIGIN Definition: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if two countries
share the same legal system (civil or common law); 0 otherwise.
Source: La Porta, et al. (1998).
TAX–DIFF Definition: Logarithm of 1 plus the absolute value of the difference
between the average tax rates of two countries, over the years from
2000 to 2006.
Source: Ernst & Young, Corporate Tax Guides, 2000-2006.
LAB–COST–DIFF Definition: Logarithm of 1 plus the absolute value of the differ-
ence between the average hourly gross labour cost of each pair of
countries, over the years from 2000 to 2006.
Source: Eurostat
PRESS–COVERAGE Definition: The number of times a country appears in the head-
lines of another country’s main newspaper, divided by the number
of total headline news in that newspaper that cite one of the coun-
tries in our sample over the years from 2000 to 2006.
continued . . .
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Variable Definition and sources
Source: Factiva database.
HIERARCHY Definition: This variable is obtained from the following question
‘People have different ideas about following instructions at work.
Some say that one should follow one’s superior’s instructions even
when one does not fully agree with them. Others say that one
should follow one’s superior’s instructions only when one is con-
vinced that they are right. With which of these two opinions do
you agree? (1) Should follow instructions (2) Must be convinced
first (3) Depends.’ For each country we compute the share of
respondents who choose the first answer, and average them over
the survey waves. For each country pair, we then compute the
logarithm of 1 plus the absolute value of the difference between
their respective shares of first answer.
Source: European Value Survey, waves 1981-1984 and 1990-1993.
INDIVIDUALISM Definition: This variable is obtained from the following question
“Incomes should be more equal or we need larger income differ-
ences as incentives for individual effort”. For each country we
compute the share of respondents who answer ‘Should not equal-
ize income’ and then average them over the survey waves. For
each country pair we then compute the logarithm of 1 plus the
absolute value of the difference between their respective shares of
answer against income equalization.
Source: European Value Survey, waves 1981-1984 and 1990-1993.
CULTURAL–
ATTRACTIVENESS
Definition: We build this variable following the methodology of Li
et al. (2007). The score measure is given by the sum, over nine cul-
tural dimensions, of the Euclidean distance between the cultural
practice index for cultural dimension i in the destination country
P di , and the cultural value index for the same cultural dimension i,
of the origin country V oi :
√∑9
i=1(6− |P di − V oi |)2. The nine cul-
tural dimensions, ranked on a 1-7 scale, are: Performance Orien-
tation, Assertiveness, Future Orientation, Human Orientation, In-
stitutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, Gender Egalitar-
ianism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance. The data come
from the GLOBE Phase 2 Aggregated Societal Level Database
for Society Culture Scales, described in House, et al. (2004). A
larger score indicates closer cultural practices and values for the
destination and origin countries.
Source: GLOBE project, www.globeproject.com.
continued . . .
39
Variable Definition and sources
SOMATIC–DISTANCE Definition: Measure of somatic distance based on the average pop-
ulation frequency of specific somatic traits, developed by Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2009). For height, hair color, and cephalic
index (the ratio of the length and width of the skull), Biasutti
(1954) maps the prevailing traits in each country in Europe. For
each trait, European countries fall into three different categories.
For instance, hair color is categorized ‘Blond prevails,’ ‘Mix of
blond and dark,’ and ‘Dark prevails.’ The measure assigns a score
of 1 to 3 to each trait, taking for each country its prevalent somatic
trait category. It then computes the somatic distance between two
countries as the sum of the absolute value of the difference in each
of the three traits.
Source: Biasutti (1954) and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009).
RELIGIOUS–
SIMILARITY
Definition: Probability that two randomly chosen individuals in
two countries will share the same religion. This is computed as the
product of the fraction of individuals in country j and in country i
belonging to religion k, according to the World Value Survey, and
then summing across k. Religions are: Catholic, Protestant, Jew-
ish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Orthodox, no-religion, and other
affiliation.
Source: Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009)
GENETIC–DISTANCE Definition: Difference between the frequencies of alleles in the
populations of a country pair; the larger is this measure, the more
the two populations are genetically separated.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3. Count of FDI companies by investor type
This table reports the count of FDI companies for the whole sample and by type of foreign investor (ultimate
owner): industrial, financial or individual. The table also splits the count of FDI according to the industry
(manufacturing or services) and the knowledge characteristics of the industry: high-tech manufacturing in-
dustries and knowledge-intensive services. High-Tech industries are defined in Benfratello, Schiantarelli and
Sembenelli (2008): chemicals, non-electric machinery, office equipment and computers, electric machinery,
electronic material, measurement and communication tools, TV and radio, medical apparels and instruments,
vehicle, other transportation. Knowledge-Intensive services are defined by Eurostat: Post and Telecommu-
nications, Computer and related activities, Research and development, Water transport, Air transport, Real
estate activities, Renting of machinery and equipment without operator, and of personal and household
goods. The last three rows report FDI company median initial size, measured by the company total assets
in the first year after incorporation (in Euro), also by industry. Variables are defined in Table 1.
Whole Sample Industrial Financial Individual
Number of FDI 33,040 16,939 5,202 10,899
% FDI in manufacturing 9.1 10.5 8.6 7.1
of which: % in High-Tech 42.2 45.7 41.8 34.5
% FDI in services 90.8 89.5 91.5 92.9
of which: % in Knowledge-Intensive 62.1 61.1 73.9 58.1
Median initial size 31,630 87,430 75,020 16,330
Median initial size in manufacturing 170,910 378,320 411,580 30,610
Median initial size in services 27,700 74,290 65,000 10,200
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Table 4. FDI by investor type and co-investor location
This table reports the count of FDI companies and its share broken down (in successive columns) by com-
panies: (i) with no co-investor; (ii) with co-investor; these are further divided into companies: (iii) with a
co-investor from the destination country, or (iv) with a co-investor from the origin (investor) country. Panel
A reports data for the whole sample, Panels B, C, and D split the data by type of investor (ultimate owner).
The table also reports (in successive rows) the percentage of FDI companies in manufacturing (and the per-
centage of which is in High-Tech, HT) and in services (and the percentage of which is Knowledge-Intensive,
KI). The last row of each panel reports the median initial size of FDI companies, measured by a company
total assets in the first year after incorporation (in Euro) in each category. Variables are defined in Table 1.
Panel A: Whole Sample
No co-investor With co-investor
Total Destination country Origin Country
Number of FDI 31,051 1,989 1,006 983
% FDI 94.0 6.0 3.0 3.0
% FDI in manufacturing 9.1 9.1 9.8 8.3
of which: % in HT 42.1 44.8 43.4 46.3
%FDI in services 91.0 91.0 90.2 91.7
of which: % in KI 62.6 54.6 52.8 56.4
Median initial size 33,670 20,580 17,490 20,580
Panel B: Industrial Investors
No co-investor With co-investor
Total Destination country Origin Country
Number of FDI 16,380 559 376 183
% FDI 96.7 3.3 2.2 1.1
% FDI in manufacturing 10.5 10.9 11.7 9.3
of which: %in HT 45.8 44.3 47.7 35.3
%FDI in services 89.5 89.1 88.3 90.7
of which: % in KI 61.3 54.6 52.7 58.4
Median initial size 90,111 53,660 24,670 151,780
Panel C: Financial Investors
No co-investor With co-investor
Total Destination country Origin Country
Number of FDI 5,029 173 106 67
%FDI 96.7 3.3 2.0 1.3
% FDI in manufacturing 8.4 13.3 17.9 6.0
of which: % in HT 42.2 34.8 31.6 50.0
%FDI in services 91.6 86.7 82.1 94.0
of which: % in KI 73.9 73.3 72.4 74.6
Median initial size 76,430 61,580 39,250 90,300
Panel D: Individual Investors
No co-investor With co-investor
Total Destination country Origin Country
Number of FDI 9,642 1,257 524 733
%FDI 88.5 11.5 4.8 6.7
% FDI in manufacturing 7.0 7.7 6.9 8.3
of which: % in HT 32.6 47.4 44.4 49.2
%FDI in services 93.0 92.3 93.1 91.7
of which: % in KI 58.9 52.2 49.4 54.2
Median initial size 17,000 8,000 8,000 14,330
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics at country-pair level
This table reports descriptive statistics. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variables,
for the whole sample and for sub-samples split by type of investor (ultimate owner): industrial, financial,
and individual. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables. Variables are defined in
Table 1.
Panel A. Dependent variables
Mean St.Dev. 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Observations
COUNT–FDI
Whole Sample 131 408 3 22 96 252
Industrial 67 143 2 14 58 252
Financial 21 61 0 2 16 252
Individual 43 299 0 1 7 252
SIZE–FDI (Mil. Euro)
Whole Sample 2,607 8,668 4 151 1,180 252
Industrial 1,975 7,448 1 90 665 252
Financial 557 1,886 0 2 196 252
Individual 74 236 0 0 9 252
Panel B. Explanatory variables
Mean St.Dev. 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Observation
TRUST 20.91 12.06 12.00 18.00 26.00 252
CONTIGUITY 0.15 0.36 - - - 252
DISTANCE 7.00 0.68 6.65 7.14 7.52 252
COMMON–LANGUAGE 0.11 0.31 - - - 252
SAME–LEGAL–ORIGIN 0.29 0.45 - - - 252
TAX–DIFF 1.58 0.70 1.10 1.63 2.06 252
LAB–COST–DIFF 1.94 0.78 1.36 1.98 2.59 252
PRESS–COVERAGE 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.07 203
HIERARCHY 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.16 179
INDIVIDUALISM 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.08 179
CULTURAL-ATTRACTIVENESS 14.20 0.56 13.87 14.21 14.58 165
SOMATIC–DISTANCE 2.46 1.23 2.00 2.00 3.00 252
RELIGIOUS–SIMILARITY 0.38 0.35 0.02 0.38 0.68 252
GENETIC–DISTANCE 0.75 0.54 0.36 0.64 0.96 182
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Table 6. The effect of trust on FDI companies: Count
This table reports results for Poisson and IV-Poisson estimation of equation (1) discussed in section 5.1.
The dependent variable is COUNT–FDI. The table reports results for the whole sample and for the split
into industrial, financial, and individual investors (ultimate owners). Odd-numbered columns report re-
sults for Poisson regressions, while even-numbered columns report results for IV-Poisson regressions where
TRUST is instrumented (see Nichols (2007)). The instrumental variables are SOMATIC–DISTANCE and
RELIGIOUS–SIMILARITY. Variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors (shown in parenthesis) are
robust to heteroscedasticity. Fixed effects for the country of origin (country of the investor) and for the
country of destination (country of the FDI company) are included but not reported. Coefficients significant
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are marked with *, **, and ***.
Whole sample Industrial Financial Individual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Poisson IV Poisson IV Poisson IV Poisson IV
TRUST 0.015* 0.104*** 0.019*** 0.078*** 0.017 0.077 0.035 0.129
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.21) (0.02) (0.16)
CONTIGUITY 0.511*** 0.721*** 0.291** 0.880*** 0.327* -1.054 1.198*** 1.175
(0.12) (0.22) (0.12) (0.29) (0.18) (0.74) (0.29) (0.72)
DISTANCE -0.610*** -0.265 -0.668*** -0.242 -0.738*** -2.487 -0.721*** -0.930
(0.08) (0.17) (0.08) (0.19) (0.12) (1.94) (0.23) (0.83)
COMMON-LANGUAGE 0.261 0.290 0.074 -0.303 -0.307 2.629 0.330 1.064
(0.17) (0.31) (0.16) (0.33) (0.24) (1.61) (0.50) (1.56)
SAME-LEGAL-ORIGIN 1.174*** 0.236 0.896*** 0.412* 1.185*** -0.323 0.939*** 1.549
(0.11) (0.25) (0.09) (0.23) (0.13) (1.49) (0.31) (1.49)
Constant 11.293*** 7.966*** 11.024*** 7.896*** 10.178*** 24.174 9.693*** 10.472
(0.56) (1.33) (0.54) (1.41) (0.82) (16.30) (1.52) (6.86)
Destination Country F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Country F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Predicted % zeros 9.54 10.53 12.04 15.32 29.51 36.24 38.23 42.75
Actual % zeros 11.51 11.51 14.68 14.68 33.33 33.33 45.24 45.24
Marginal Effect of Trust
1st quartile 0.07 0.40 0.05 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Median 0.32 1.99 0.25 0.98 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.15
3rd quartile 1.38 11.29 1.19 4.98 0.28 3.91 0.25 2.56
Observations 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252
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Table 7. First-stage estimation results
This table reports results from the first stage. The dependent variable is TRUST, and the estimation method
is OLS. The table also reports the F-statistic of a joint test whether all excluded instruments (SOMATIC–
DISTANCE and RELIGIOUS–SIMILARITY) are significantly different from zero. Variables are defined
in Table 1. Standard errors (shown in parenthesis) are robust to heteroscedasticity. Fixed effects for the
country of origin (country of the investor) and for the country of destination (country of the FDI company)

















Destination Country F.E. Yes
Origin Country F.E. Yes
R2 0.86
F-statistic [p-value] 27.73 [0.00]
Observations 252
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Table 8. The effect of trust on FDI companies: Size (whole sample)
This table reports results from the OLS, the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML), the Gamma
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (Gamma), and the IV-GMM estimates of equation (2) discussed in section
5.1. The dependent variable is SIZE–FDI logarithmic transformed in columns (1) and (4), and SIZE-FDI
expressed in Million Euro in columns (2) and (3). The table reports results for the whole sample. In the
IV-GMM regression TRUST is instrumented by SOMATIC–DISTANCE and RELIGIOUS–SIMILARITY.
Variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors (shown in parenthesis) are robust to heteroscedasticity.
Fixed effects for the country of origin (country of the investor) and for the country of destination (country of
the FDI company) are included but not reported. For details about the Park (or Ma-Mu) test, see Manning
and Mullahy (2001), and Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level
are marked with *, **, and ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS PPML Gamma IV
TRUST 0.056** -0.005 0.054** 0.083*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
CONTIGUITY -0.042 0.012 0.117 -0.001
(0.44) (0.26) (0.43) (0.49)
DISTANCE -1.356*** -1.581*** -1.049*** -1.242***
(0.29) (0.16) (0.34) (0.39)
COMMON-LANGUAGE -0.532 -0.348 -0.258 -0.548
(0.54) (0.29) (0.48) (0.53)
SAME-LEGAL-ORIGIN 1.163*** 0.356 1.032*** 0.989**
(0.33) (0.25) (0.30) (0.45)
Constant 19.114*** 21.049*** 18.325*** 17.906***
(2.01) (1.14) (2.45) (3.13)
Destination Country F.E Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Country F.E Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.77 0.77
Park (or Ma-Mu) Test:
λ̂ 1.848 1.805 1.922
(log) Residuals Kurtosis 4.17 5.22 4.61
Hansen J Statistic 2.69
[p-value] 0.10
Cragg-Donald Statistic 25.41
Observations 223 252 252 223
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Table 9. The effect of trust on FDI companies: Size
This table reports results from OLS and IV-GMM estimates of equation (2) discussed in section 5.1. The
dependent variable is SIZE–FDI (logarithmic transformed). The table reports results for the split into
industrial, financial, and individual investors (ultimate owners). Odd-numbered columns report results from
OLS regressions, while even-numbered columns report results from IV-GMM regressions where TRUST
is instrumented. The instrumental variables are SOMATIC–DISTANCE and RELIGIOUS–SIMILARITY.
Variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors (shown in parenthesis) are robust to heteroscedasticity.
Fixed effects for the country of origin (country of the investor) and for the country of destination (country
of the FDI company) are included but not reported. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level
are marked with *, **, and ***.
Industrial Financial Individual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
TRUST 0.057** 0.082 0.067* 0.111 -0.021 -0.117
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.12)
CONTIGUITY -0.114 -0.093 -0.252 -0.245 1.291 1.075
(0.40) (0.53) (0.82) (0.71) (0.86) (0.91)
DISTANCE -1.511*** -1.416*** -1.190* -1.028* -1.788** -2.115***
(0.32) (0.41) (0.67) (0.57) (0.72) (0.76)
COMMON-LANGUAGE -0.205 -0.205 -0.257 -0.251 -3.804*** -3.608***
(0.49) (0.59) (0.81) (0.81) (1.11) (1.08)
SAME-LEGAL-ORIGIN 0.981** 0.820* 1.720*** 1.446** 2.529*** 3.228***
(0.40) (0.48) (0.57) (0.68) (0.73) (1.08)
Constant 26.828*** 25.782*** 22.522*** 20.702*** 23.615*** 27.490***
(2.17) (3.27) (4.48) (4.54) (4.83) (6.45)
Destination Country F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Country F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.71 0.71 0.55 0.54 0.48 0.46
Hansen J Statistic 3.72 1.98 0.00
[p-value] [0.05] [0.16] [0.97]
Cragg-Donald Statistic 25.36 21.12 8.18
Observations 215 215 168 168 138 138
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Table 10. Estimation results for the Presence of a Co-investor from the
Destination Country
This table reports results from Probit and IV Probit estimates of equation (3) discussed in section 5.2.
The dependent variable is CO–INVESTOR–DESTINATION. The table reports results for the whole sam-
ple and for the split into industrial, financial, and individual investors (ultimate owners). Odd-numbered
columns report results from Probit regressions, while even-numbered columns report results from IV-Probit
regressions where TRUST is instrumented. The instrumental variables are SOMATIC–DISTANCE and
RELIGIOUS–SIMILARITY. Variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors (shown in parenthesis) are
clustered at country of origin–country of destination level. Fixed effects for the country of origin (country of
the investor), for the country of destination (country of the FDI company) and for the incorporation year of
the FDI company are included but not reported. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are
marked with *, **, and ***.
Whole Sample Industrial Financial Individual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV
TRUST 0.010 -0.001 0.034*** 0.006 -0.044** -0.078* -0.018* -0.041**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02)
CONTIGUITY 0.006 -0.018 0.095 0.049 -0.420** -0.520** 0.040 -0.057
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.26)
DISTANCE 0.029 -0.005 0.113 0.022 -0.532*** -0.652*** 0.232 0.185
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.17) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20)
COMMON–LANGUAGE -0.003 0.036 -0.298 -0.177 0.174 0.350 0.197 -0.012
(0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.22) (0.18) (0.28) (0.16) (0.25)
SAME–LEGAL–ORIGIN 0.157 0.211* 0.100 0.229 0.629*** 0.828** 0.163 0.458*
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.24) (0.33) (0.17) (0.25)
Constant -3.333*** -2.821*** -4.563*** -3.116*** 1.951 3.000* -3.504*** -3.160**
(0.72) (0.82) (0.74) (1.17) (1.24) (1.54) (1.25) (1.31)
Destination Country F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Country F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incorporation Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marginal Effect of Trust
1st quartile 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0042 -0.0077 -0.0050 -0.0112
Median 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0020 0.0004 -0.0028 -0.0052 -0.0038 -0.0084
3rd quartile 0.0013 -0.0000 0.0033 0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0021 -0.0026 -0.0058
Observations 20,405 20,405 12,227 12,227 3,469 3,469 4,131 4,131
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Table 11. Estimation results for the presence of a Co-investor from the Origin
Country
This table presents results from Probit and IV-Probit estimates of equation (3) discussed in section 5.2.
The dependent variable is CO–INVESTOR–ORIGIN. The table reports results for the whole sample and
for the split into industrial, financial, and individual investors (ultimate owners). Odd-numbered columns
report results from Probit regressions, while even-numbered columns report results from IV-Probit estimates
where TRUST is instrumented. The instrumental variables are SOMATIC–DISTANCE and RELIGIOUS–
SIMILARITY. Variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors (shown in parenthesis) are clustered at
country of origin–country of destination level. Fixed effects for the country of origin (country of the investor),
for the country of destination (country of the FDI company) and for the incorporation year of the FDI
company are included but not reported. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are marked
with *, **, and ***.
Whole Sample Industrial Financial Individual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV
TRUST 0.0002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.031* -0.00003 0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
CONTIGUITY -0.045 -0.046 -0.372*** -0.373*** 0.220 0.064 -0.054 -0.049
(0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20) (0.14) (0.14)
DISTANCE -0.113 -0.116 -0.200* -0.202* 0.227 0.119 -0.069 -0.078
(0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12)
COMMON–LANGUAGE -0.375*** -0.365*** -0.099 -0.093 -0.155 0.081 -0.771*** -0.778***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.17) (0.19) (0.25) (0.28) (0.15) (0.16)
SAME–LEGAL–ORIGIN -0.004 0.007 -0.223 -0.216 0.255 0.371 0.067 0.028
(0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.16) (0.26) (0.25) (0.16) (0.25)
Constant -1.535*** -1.483*** -1.091 -1.056 -4.143*** -3.058*** -1.298* -1.301*
(0.45) (0.50) (0.74) (0.81) (1.15) (0.98) (0.68) (0.68)
Destination Country F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Country F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incorporation Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marginal Effect of Trust
1st quartile 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0014 -0.0000 0.0002
Median 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0000 0.0005
3rd quartile 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0010
Observations 32,034 32,034 16,276 16,276 4,686 4,686 10,329 10,329
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